אתר זה משתמש בקובצי Cookies כדי להבטיח שתקבל את החוויה הטובה ביותר באתר שלנו. קראו את מדיניות הפרטיות ותנאי השימוש.
קיימים מספר ערוצי קבלה.
בכל אחד מערוצים אלו, יש לעמוד בנוסף ביתר תנאי הקבלה. פירוט נוסף ניתן למצוא בקטגוריית מועמדים וכן במדריך לנרשם.
חישוב ממוצע הבגרות כולל בונוס עם ציון מבחן הפסיכומטרי או התיל.
ציון ההתאמה הקובע לקבלה למרכז האקדמי לב הוא 79 לקבלה על תנאי או 80 ומעלה לקבלה תקינה.
למחשבון ציון ההתאמה לחץ כאן
הלימודים מתחילים בסמסטר אלול. במהלך הסמסטר לומדים, בנוסף ללימודי קודש, גם את קורסי הקדם במתמטיקה, מחשבים ופיזיקה (משתנה מחוג לחוג). הסמסטר אורך כחודש ומטרתו לסייע לסטודנטים לחזק ולרענן את הידע בתחומים אלו לקראת הקורסים המתקדמים של סמסטר א'. לכל תלמיד חדש מפורט במכתב הקבלה אילו קורסים הוא מחויב ללמוד בסמסטר אלול.
שכר הלימוד במרכז האקדמי לב הוא שכר לימוד אוניברסיטאי מופחת ונקבע כל שנה על פי החלטת המועצה להשכלה גבוהה.
שכר הלימוד אינו כולל תשלומים עבור לימודי קודש, קורסי יסוד באנגלית, קורסי קדם ואגרות.
מבחן פוטנציאל שבודק כישורים ותכונות רלוונטיים ללימודים האקדמיים. מבחן זה מוכר כמקביל למבחן הפסיכומטרי עבור קבלה למרכז האקדמי לב, למעט למועמדי העתודה האקדמית ומועמדים לחוג לסיעוד.
המבדקים נמשכים כ-4 שעות ומתייחסים למידת ההתאמה לחוג המבוקש. המבדקים מוצגים באמצעות צג המחשב ואין כל צורך בהתנסות קודמת בהפעלת מחשב על מנת להצליח בהם. מבחן להתנסות עצמית ניתן למצוא באתר תיל אינטרנשיונל. לפרטים נוספים על המבחן ושאלות לדוגמא- לחץ כאן
בקשה לשינוי רישום יש לשלוח במייל למדור רישום. יש לציין בפניה שם מלא ומספר זהות.
מדור רישום לב harshama@jct.ac.il
מדור רישום טל harshama-tal@jct.ac.il
מדור רישום לוסטיג oritmu@jct.ac.il
מדור רישום תבונה tvuna@jct.ac.il
ניתן לבצע שינוי כל עוד החוג פתוח להרשמה. השינוי חייב להתבצע ע"י פניה במייל למדור מידע ורישום.
במידה והנך עומד בכל תנאי הקבלה, מכתב הקבלה יישלח במייל בתוך שבוע ממועד קיום הריאיון.
1986-1989 B.Sc. Mathematics, Cum Laude, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Dean’s Honor List 1989.
1989-1992 M.Sc. Statistics: Operations research, Game theory. Cum Laude, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Thesis title: The game on the speed of convergence in repeated games with incomplete Information. Supervisor: Prof. Shmuel Zamir.
Thesis grade 100.
2000-2006 Ph.D. Computational neuroscience. Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for the Study of Rationality and Interdisciplinary Center for Neural Computation. Thesis title: The Game Motoneurons Play.
Supervisors:Prof. Shmuel Zamir and Prof. Idan Segev.
2006-2007 Postdoctorate at the Center for the Study of Rationality and the Interdisciplinary Center for Neural Computation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Subject of study: Computational Neuroscience: Competitive processes in the nervous system.
2007-2009 Lecturer the Business administration department at the academic College of Management, Rishon Le’tsion.
2009- 2010 Faculty member the Industrial engineering and management department at SCE: Shamoon College of Engineering.
Since 2010 Faculty member the Industrial engineering and management department at Lev academic center (JCT).
Since 2016 Chairman of the department of Industrial engineering & management. Lev academic center (JCT).
1989 Dean’s Honor List (Mathematics).
2001 - 2005 The Iris Barben Scholarship.
2012 Prize for excellence in teaching. (Lev academic center)
2013-2019 Excellence reward (גמול הצטיינות).
2012-2016 Reduction in teaching hours for research.
The game on the speed of convergence in Repeated games with incomplete information.
In the field of Game theory, I have analyzed infinitely repeated two-person zero-sum games with incomplete information on one side. In games in which the `maximizer’ is the more informed player, the maximizer can guarantee that all along the game the average payoffs per stage will be greater than or equal to the value of the game and will converge from above to the value. Thus there is a conflict of interest between the two players as to the speed of convergence of the average payoffs; The maximizer wishes for the convergence to be slow whereas the minimizer (which is paying this additional payoff) would like it to be fast. Hence, in the context of such repeated games, we define a game for the speed of convergence. I proved that the value of this game exists for games with the highest error term, i.e., games in which the error term is of the order of magnitude of . I then show a class of games for which the value does not exist. Given any infinite martingale , I defined for each : For my first result I proved that for a uniformly bounded, infinite martingale , can be of the order of magnitude of for arbitrarily small
Game theoretic analysis of the competition between motoneurons innervating a muscle.
We offer a new game-theoretical approach to analyze the developmental competition between motoneurons (motor-neurons) that innervate the same muscle. The size principle—stating that motoneurons with successively higher activation thresholds innervate successively larger portions of muscle—is thought to result from this competition. However, it was not known how. We define a game in which motoneurons “compete” to innervate a maximal number of muscle-fibers. Their strategies are their activity levels. We resolve an existing paradox of contradictory experimental data regarding the role of activity in this competition, explain the emergence of the size principle, and provide new experimentally testable predictions. We conclude that the time of winnings has a competitive value, such that it is better to win more in later competitions. This conclusion has implications for economical systems.
A New Measure for the Risk in Deviating from Nash equilibrium.
The purpose of this work is to offer for each player and any Nash equilibrium (NE),
a measure for the potential risk in deviating from the NE strategy in any two person
matrix game. We present two approaches regarding the nature of deviations: Strategic
and Accidental. Accordingly, we define two models: S-model and T-model. The S-model
defines a new game in which players deviate in the least dangerous direction. The risk
defined in the T-model can serve as a refinement for the notion of “trembling hand perfect
equilibrium” introduced by R. Selten. The risk measures enable testing and evaluating
predictions on the behavior of players. For example: do players deviate more from a NE
that is less risky? This may be relevant to the design of experiments. We present an
Integer programming problem that computes the risk for any given player and NE. In
the special case of zero-sum games with a unique strictly mixed NE, we prove that the
risks of the players always coincide, even if the game is far from symmetry. This result
holds for any norm we use for the size of deviations. We compare our risk measures to
the risk measure defined by Harsanyi and Selten which is based on criteria of stability
rather than on potential damage. We show that the measures may contradict.
Games with Costly winnings.
We introduce a new sequential game, where each player has a limited resource that he
needs to spend on increasing the probability of winning each stage, but also on maintaining
the assets that he has won in the previous stages. Thus, the players’ strategies
must take into account that winning at any given stage negatively affects the chances of
winning in later stages. Whenever the initial resources of the players are not too small,
we present explicit strategies for the players, and show that they are a Nash equilibrium, which is unique in an appropriate sense.
On the price of anarchy in a single server queue with heterogeneous service valuations induced by travel costs.
This work presents a strategic observable model where customer heterogeneity is induced by the cus- tomers’ locations and travel costs. The arrival of customers with distances less than x is assumed to be Poisson with rate equal to the integral from 0 to x , of a nonnegative intensity function h . In a loss system M/G/1/1 we define the threshold Nash equilibrium strategy x e and the socially-optimal threshold strategy x ∗. We investigate the dependence of the price of anarchy (PoA) on the parameter x e and the intensity function. For example, if the potential arrival rate is bounded then PoA is bounded and converges to 1 when x e goes to infinity. On the other hand, if the potential arrival rate is unbounded, we prove that x ∗/ x e always goes to 0, when x e goes to infinity and yet, in some cases PoA is bounded and even converges to 1; if h converges to a positive constant then PoA converges to 2; if h increases then the limit of PoA is at least 2, whereas if h decreases then PoA is bounded and the limit of PoA is at most 2. In a system with a queue we prove that PoA may be unbounded already in the simplest case of uniform arrival.
A puzzled driver is a better driver: Enforcing speed limits using a randomization strategy.
Traffic police faces the problem of enforcing speed limits under restricted budget. Implementing high Enforcement Thresholds (ET) will ease the work load on the police but will also intensify the problem of speeding. We model this as a game between the police, which wishes that drivers obey the speed limits, and the drivers who wish to speed without getting caught. For the police we construct a multi-stage strategy in which at each stage the ET is randomized between low and high values. This confuses the drivers who now need to consider the worst case of low ET. We establish analytically and by simulations that this strategy gradually reduces the ET until it converges to the desired speed limit without increasing the work load along the process. Importantly, this method works even if the strategy is known to the drivers. We study the effect of several factors on the convergence rate of the process. Interestingly, we find that increasing the frequency of randomization is more effective in expediting the process than raising the average amount of fines.
When to buy and when to sell when price is constant.
Consider consumers who prefer to consume a good later rather than earlier. If the price is constant, then we would expect consumers to wait to buy the good. That does not hold if consumers are concerned that others will buy the good early, so that a shortage will later occur. Examining the equilibrium behavior of consumers, and the fixed price a profit-maximizing firm would charge, we find that a firm profits by not selling early. If, however, the firm is obligated to also offer the good early, then with both deterministic and stochastic demand the firm may maximize profits by setting a price which induces consumers to all arrive early, or all arrive late, depending on the good's value to the customers.
b+c. Summary of Current and Future Directions for Research and Development activities
a. Peer-Reviewed Papers in Refereed Journals
66: 426–461. Q1
b. Peer-Reviewed Papers in Refereed Conference Proceedings
E) Conference Lectures
2009 "Predictions on the formation of nerve-muscle connection." The
International symposium on stochastic models in reliability, engineering, life sciences
and operations management, 2009 (SMRLO).
2014 "On the risk in deviating from Nash equilibrium." Annual conference of the
operations research society of Israel 2014 (ORSIS).
2014 "On the risk in deviating from Nash equilibrium." The 25th International
Conference on Game Theory, 2014, Stony Brook, USA.
2015 “The game motoneurons play.” NeuroTalk, May 2015, China.
2016 "The game on the risk in deviating from Nash Equilibrium."
The International symposium on stochastic models in reliability, engineering, life
sciences and operations management Feb, 2016 (SMRLO).
2016 “Blotto games with costly winnings” The tenth international conference on Game Theory and management (GTM2016). The international society of dynamic games (ISDG), July 2016, St. Petersburg, Russia.
2017 "Enforcing speed limits using a randomization strategy." The VIII International Conference on Optimization and Applications (OPTIMA-2017) Petrovac, Montenegro, October 2-7, 2017.
2018 "On the price of anarchy in a single server queue with heterogeneous service valuations induced by travel costs." StochMod conference, Lancester University, England, June 13-15 2018.
2019 "On the price of anarchy in a single server queue with heterogeneous service valuations induced by travel costs." EURO 2019, 30th European conference on Operational research, Dublin, Ireland, 23-26 June, 2019.
2019 "The benefit of information in a single-server queue with heterogeneous service valuations." InSite, Jerusalem, Israel, June 30-4 July, 2019.
Chairman of the department of Industrial engineering & management
Since Octonber, 2016.
Academic committee service
2014 – 2015. Committee for improving teaching methods.
Journal referring
- International journal of Game theory.
- Performance Evaluation.
Conference Session organizer
2016 The International symposium on stochastic models in reliability, engineering, life sciences and operations management (SMRLO).
Conference session chair
2014 The 25th International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, USA.
2016 The International symposium on stochastic models in reliability, engineering, life sciences and operations management (SMRLO).
2016 The tenth international conference on Game Theory and management (GTM2016), July 2016, St. Petersburg, Russia.
Courses taught
