ד"ר מיכל יוגב

2008 – 2013 Ph.D. Economics, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Israel.
Thesis: The Effect of the Marriage Market on Education across Genders: Double Side Matching Structural Model.
Supervisors: Prof. Nava Kahana, Dr. Chemi Gotlibovski.

Subject area: Labor economics, Education economics, Marriage economics.

Rector award for excellence in Ph.D studies.

2004 – 2006 M.A. Economics, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Israel.
Thesis: The Optimal Number of Settlement.
Supervisors: Prof. Nava Kahana.
Subject area: Mechanism Design.

Graduate with Great Honors.

2004 – 2006 B.A. Economics and Computer Science, Department of Economics, Faculty of Exact Science, Bar-Ilan University, Israel.

Graduate With Great Honors.

2011-today: Lev Academic Center, Lecturer, School of Management, Accounting & Information Systems.

2011-2019: Bar-Ilan University, Lecturer, The Interdisciplinary Department of Social Science.

2004-2015: Ashkelon Academic college, Lecturer.

2011, 2014, 2016, 2018– Outstanding Teacher, Lev Academic Center.

2017 - Lev Academic Center Rector award for excellence in teaching.
2010 – Rector award for excellence in Ph.D studies.

2007-2011- Doctoral Fellowship of Excellence Program, Bar Ilan University.
2004 - Scholarship for excellence in M.A studies.
2000 - Scholarship for excellence in B.A studies

In my research I examine whether the asymmetry of education across genders can be explained by a combination of the return to education in the labor market and in the marriage market, using a search model which incorporates the returns to education from both markets. The purpose of my study is to identify the economic and behavioral parameters that influence decision making by men and women aged 18-32 regarding labor supply, education, and marriage as seen in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data from 1984 through 2005. Identifying these parameters will shed light on the different incentives of men and women in the above areas. The structural dynamic model I built uses dynamic programming. In the absence of closed-form solution to individual's decisions, it has been estimated using the Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML) procedure that incorporates classification error rates for discrete outcomes and measurement error densities for continuous data. My research incorporates various directions which I hope will contribute to the existing literature. Marriage, education, and labor supply are endogenous in a collective double-sided matching model, such that individuals marry and decide not to divorce, if they predict in any period that their utility from being married is higher than their utility in the alternative option. In the framework of my model, decisions are made by men and women simultaneously. The estimation of parameters is based on constructing panel data. The theoretical model, which is estimated using SML method, allowing for classification errors, employs search model in marriage and labor market and matching model in marriage market.

2013 – Tel Aviv University, Seminar Guest.